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Abstract 
Emerging viruses have the potential to impose substantial mortality, morbidity and economic 
burdens on human populations. Tracking the spread of infectious diseases to assist in their 
control has traditionally relied on the analysis of case data gathered as the outbreak 
proceeds. Here, we describe how many of the key questions in infectious disease 
epidemiology, from the initial detection and characterization of outbreak viruses, to 
transmission chain tracking and outbreak mapping, can now be much more accurately 
addressed using recent advances in virus sequencing and phylogenetics. We highlight the 
utility of this approach with the hypothetical outbreak of an unknown pathogen, ‘Disease X’, 
suggested by the World Health Organization to be a potential cause of a future major 
epidemic. We also outline the requirements and challenges, including the need for flexible 
platforms that generate sequence data in real-time, and for these data to be shared as 
widely and openly as possible.  
Introduction 
Emerging infectious diseases present one of the greatest public health challenges of the 21st 
century. Among these are zoonotic viruses that originate from reservoir species, often 
mammals, and jump to humans to cause disease syndromes of varying form and severity. 
An emerging virus, depending on its ability to transmit among humans, can lead to individual 
or a few sporadic cases, resulting in a localized outbreak that requires public health 
intervention or, in the worst scenarios, develop into a large epidemic or global pandemic. 
Such emergence events over the past two decades are numerous and varied. They include 
viruses not previously encountered, such as the SARS and MERS coronaviruses1–3, and 
familiar foes that have reappeared to cause outbreaks, such as swine- and avian-origin 
influenza4,5, Ebola6, and Zika viruses7. Although many outbreaks end naturally, or are 
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controlled quickly, there remain questions over how best to scientifically respond to these 
events. 
The broad-scale factors responsible for viral emergence have been well documented, and 
include human population growth, the increased frequency and reach of travel, changing 
patterns of land use, changing diets, wars and social upheaval, and climate change8,9. These 
increase interactions between humans and reservoir hosts, facilitating exposure to zoonotic 
viruses and spillover infections in people, and allow emerging viruses to spread more easily 
through human populations. The interactions between virus genetics, ecology, and the host 
factors that determine virus emergence are so complex that it is impossible to predict what 
virus will cause the next epidemic, making it essential that our response is scientifically 
informed, robust, and efficient10. 
The emergence of virus outbreaks generates a set of common questions, whose answers 
are central to disease mitigation and control (Table 1) and which at times can only be 
answered by sequencing of viral genomes. These include what is the virus, is it novel, or 
does it represent the reemergence of a known pathogen; what is its mode of transmission; 
where does the emerging virus come from (in particular, what is its reservoir host and/or 
geographic source); what ecological factors underpin its emergence; how many introductions 
into humans have there been; what is the timing of these introduction events, and was there 
a period of undetected transmission before the first reported case; during flare-ups and 
future outbreaks, how are they connected to previous events; and what is the nature of virus 
evolution and is there evidence for local adaptation? In the past, many of these of questions 
were addressed using case (incidence) data, which led to estimates of key epidemic 
parameters such as the basic reproductive number (R0 - the expected number of secondary 
cases produced by each case at the start of the outbreak) that were used to inform epidemic 
control policy. Although still of fundamental importance, case data alone cannot inform public 
health management with the level of precision necessary for all targeted interventions. 
Recent advances in virus genome sequencing and phylogenetic analyses, however, mean 
that we are now in a position to answer such questions with molecular precision, and open 
new areas of investigations not previously possible based on epidemiological data alone 
(Table 1). 
Virus genomics have been used to investigate infectious disease outbreaks for several 
decades. This is possible because viruses, particularly those with RNA genomes, generate 
genetic variation on the same timescale of virus transmissions, through a combination of 
high rates of mutation and replication11,12. Consequently, it is possible to infer 
epidemiological and emergence dynamics from virus genomes sampled and sequenced 
over short epidemic timescales. We term the science of using genomics and associated 
analyses ‘genomic epidemiology’. 
Initially, genomic approaches relied upon indirect methods (e.g., restriction fragment length 
polymorphisms13) to infer genotypes and differentiate between virus strains. As direct 
sequencing technologies advanced there was a transition toward the use of nucleotide 
sequences from fragments of virus genomes for this purpose14–21. Now, thanks to advances 
in high throughput sequencing and decreasing costs22, most virus genomics studies utilize 
data sets containing tens to thousands of (near) complete virus genomes. 
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In this review, we will show how our ability to track and understand infectious disease 
outbreaks have been revolutionized by the addition of virus genomics data. We will highlight 
the varied uses of virus genomics during the different stages of viral outbreaks, from initial 
virus detection, to understanding the factors contributing towards global spread (Box 1). We 
will show how genomic epidemiology can be used to track the spread of emerging viruses, 
where the challenges lie, and establish an agenda for future work. Although we focus on 
human disease, the genome-based methodologies that we describe can be equally applied 
to animal and plant infections. Similarly, the increasing ability to rapidly sequence complete 
genomes of bacterial species, means that these technologies offer much to the study of 
emerging bacterial disease, including those associated with antimicrobial resistance. 
Outbreak detection 
Most infectious disease outbreaks start with clinicians noticing unusual patterns. Patients 
may present with patterns of symptoms that are similar to those of more common diseases, 
but which, after repeated observation and diagnostic testing, may deviate in scale, 
seasonality, or severity. At this very beginning of an outbreak the most critical task is 
therefore to identify a causal pathogen. Historically, virus identification has been performed 
using molecular tools, such as PCR and ELISA - that directly recognize pathogen-derived 
material (Box 2) - or conventional non-molecular techniques such as microscopy. The 
advent of untargeted metagenomic sequencing directly from clinical samples, however, 
means that we are now on the cusp of being able to detect human viruses in a single step, 
without a priori knowledge of putative causal pathogens (Box 2). The major advantage of 
sequencing-based approaches is the ability to detect novel viruses - such as the initial 
appearances of SARS2, MERS3, or Lujo virus23 - or unexpected ones, as exemplified by 
Ebola virus during the 2013-2016 epidemic in West Africa24. 
Once an outbreak has been detected and a causal virus identified, several basic questions 
can immediately be answered about the virus itself, including: (1) whether it is novel or 
previously known to infect humans, and (2) if we have the diagnostics, vaccines, and 
therapeutics available to fight it. Importantly, the generation of virus genomics data at this 
stage will provide deeper insights into these questions by uncovering molecular details not 
possible with conventional tools. Phylogenetics will also provide an additional level of detail, 
revealing virus origins, evolutionary characteristics, and connections to previous outbreaks in 
the same region, or to transmissions in other regions6. Given high enough relatedness to 
other members of a virus family with well-defined reservoir hosts (e.g., old-world 
arenaviruses25), the sequence identification of novel virus species can also be informative 
about potential reservoirs. 
First snapshot of an outbreak 
Immediately after a viral outbreak has been identified there exists a ‘fog-of-war’. The extent 
of the outbreak, the timing and nature of its source, and the contribution of human-to-human 
transmission will be extremely limited, yet these data are critical to designing effective 
responses. Genomic epidemiology, if applied quickly and comprehensively, holds the 
potential to answering these questions24. 
To provide an initial snapshot of an outbreak, it is important to understand the diversity of 
circulating viruses from as many cases as possible. Virus genetic diversity, measured as the 
average number of nucleotide differences among viruses in the population, will increase as 
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an outbreak progresses due to the accumulation of genetic changes in virus genomes at 
each round of viral replication6. If this rate of mutational accumulation is relatively constant - 
that is, it conforms to a ‘molecular clock’ of evolutionary change26 - then the rate at which it 
occurs (referred to as the ‘evolutionary rate’) allows us to estimate when the sequenced 
viruses last shared a common ancestor. Critically, this provides a lower bound on when an 
outbreak began, and how long the virus had been circulating prior to discovery5,27,28. If the 
virus genomes have been sampled over only a limited time-scale, so that only a few 
mutations have accumulated in the virus population, then evolutionary rates will need to be 
based on those from prior outbreaks or extrapolations from related viruses29. Later in an 
epidemic, when viruses have been sequenced over a sufficient period of time to capture 
mutational accumulation, evolutionary rates can be readily estimated directly from virus 
genomes sampled during the outbreak30–32. Evolutionary rate estimates, however, can be 
sensitive to model specification over short periods of time33 and depend on the timescale of 
measurement34. Such issues, as well as the unwarranted implications about changes in 
transmissibility and virulence that may accompany seemingly inflated evolutionary rates, 
have been discussed in detail in the context of the 2013-2016 Ebola epidemic in West 
Africa6. 
A common approach to phylogenetic analysis of the genetic diversity of a virus population is 
to infer a tree from sampled virus genomes with branches measured in units of time (i.e., a 
rooted, time-calibrated tree). This can provide estimates of the date of the last common 
ancestor at the root of the tree, as well as each individual branching event. As an 
approximation, these branching events correspond to virus transmission from one case to 
the next, an insight that offers further key information about the unfolding outbreak35. In 
addition, models of how the process of virus transmission relates to the shape of 
phylogenetic trees (Fig. 1) enable important epidemiological inferences. In particular, 
coalescent models relate the rate at which virus lineages of a phylogenetic tree merge, as 
common ancestors, to the size of the epidemic. This uses the simple premise that, for a 
sample of virus genomes, the larger the outbreak is, the further back in time the common 
ancestor will be found (Fig. 1a-c). 
Early in an outbreak, one of the primary concerns is to understand the rate at which the virus 
may be spreading through the human population. As noted in the Introduction, this can be 
assessed by estimating R0, which is critical for epidemiological projections and for planning 
public health responses. While R0 can be calculated through epidemiological analyses of 
case counts, accurate estimates of such data may not be available early in an outbreak, 
since they require a time-series of cases. As demonstrated during the early spread of the 
novel influenza A/H1N1 virus in 2009, phylogenetic inference of epidemic growth based on 
virus genomics can provide estimates of R0 comparable to that inferred from case data36. 
These calculations can be performed using coalescent models that directly estimate R0, 
based on classic susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) models37,38. A similar group of models 
analyze patterns of lineage birth-death, linking the shape of trees to the rate at which virus 
lineages split and go extinct, and have recently gained popularity39,40. Both approaches were 
applied during the 2013-2016 epidemic in West Africa to calculate R0 to assess Ebola virus 
transmission dynamics, and illuminated the impact of ‘superspreader’ events41,42. All of these 
methods, however, are beholden to the inherent uncertainty of genome sequence data, 
especially at the start of an epidemic where such sequences exhibit limited variability and 
sampling may be biased. Hence, phylogenetic estimates of R0, although likely indicative of 
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broad characteristics such as epidemic growth, may not be precise enough to make critical 
decisions in the absence of corroborating (epidemiological) information. 
The initial snapshot of virus genome sequences can also provide critical insights into the role 
of a zoonotic transmission during an outbreak (Fig. 1d). Genomic analyses, for example, 
revealed that Lassa fever virus, which is endemic in West Africa43, primarily spreads via 
repeated transmission from local rodent reservoirs, as opposed to sustained human-to-
human transmission44. This is in contrast to Ebola virus during the 2013-2016 epidemic in 
West Africa, where genomic epidemiology showed that the outbreak was the result of a 
single zoonotic spillover, followed by sustained human-to-human transmission45. 
Given availability of virus genomes from potential zoonotic reservoirs, another aim of early 
virus sequencing from an outbreak is to uncover the identity and geographic location of the 
reservoir host. The influenza A/H1N1 pandemic that started in 2009 was quickly recognised 
as being a likely species jump from pigs, as all of the virus genomic segments closely 
matched those previously seen in swine4,5. Like the 2013-2016 Ebola epidemic in West 
Africa, the influenza A/H1N1 pandemic likely started as a single introduction into humans 
that occurred a few months before it was detected5. The initial suspicion, and later 
confirmation, that the spillover occurred in Mexico, was complicated by a lack of widespread 
zoonotic genomic surveillance in this region. Retrospective sequencing of samples from 
Mexican pigs, however, showed that there were close relatives of the human virus circulating 
in this country at the time of the epidemic, confirming its origin46. 
Transmission chain tracking  
Beyond the initial characterization of an outbreak, virus genome sequencing offers 
enormous potential for determining transmission chains to understand networks of ‘who-
infected-whom’. The tracking of transmission chains has long been a standard part of public 
health responses to outbreaks, providing critical information that can be used to interrupt 
virus spread and reduce the magnitude of an outbreak. This work has traditionally been 
performed using interview-based contact tracing, which is labor-intensive and limited by the 
availability and openness of patients for interviews. This approach is particularly challenging 
during large outbreaks characterized by large numbers of co-occurring transmission chains. 
Virus genomic-based approaches can provide much more in-depth information compared to 
traditional non-sequencing based approaches, as the branching patterns of phylogenetic 
trees approximately correspond to transmissions from one case to the next (Fig. 1)35. Virus 
genome sequences, for example, were used to reconstruct the spread of foot-and-mouth 
disease virus in the United Kingdom, including the identification of superspreader events47–
49. Genomic data also played a critical role in understanding flare-ups during the West 
African Ebola outbreak50–52, where phylogenetic analyses showed that most of the flare-ups 
were linked to persistently infected Ebola survivors (Fig. 2a), thereby demonstrating sexual 
transmission of the virus50,52. None of these insights would have been possible without virus 
genomic data. 
The utility of virus genomic data for the inference of transmission chains is dependent on 
several factors, including: (1) the evolutionary rate of the virus, (2) the length of time 
between the infections of interest, and (3) the proportion of sampled cases, which together 
determine the resolution of the genetic signal (Fig. 2b). Although RNA viruses exhibit 
remarkably high evolutionary rates53, their small genome sizes and short epidemiological 
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generation times often result in, on average, less than one substitution per transmission 
event (Fig. 2b)54–56. Hence, virus genomics alone often cannot be expected to perfectly 
reconstruct transmission chains at the level of individual infections. Combined with 
epidemiological data, however, virus genomics provides a powerful tool for restricting the 
number of possible transmission scenarios and for supporting novel modes of 
transmission47,57,58. In addition, most phylogenetics-based transmission chain analyses have 
been performed using virus consensus sequences (i.e., a single genome per sample/patient 
that represents the average of the virus population), which may limit resolution. However, as 
virus infections exhibit diverse intra-host populations (containing intra-host single nucleotide 
variants, or iSNVs44), newer methods incorporating viral iSNVs may greatly increase the 
resolution of transmission chain analyses so long as multiple variants are transmitted 
between hosts59. 
Outbreak mapping 
As described in the previous sections, genomic epidemiology can be used to detect an 
outbreak, show its origin, and elucidate transmission patterns. Evolutionary inferences from 
virus genomes, unlike non-sequencing based methods, can also be used to dissect the 
spatial structure and dynamics of spread, as well as assess how an epidemic may unfold 
through time and space. 
Uncovering the spatial patterns of virus spread during outbreaks is a key objective that has 
been transformed by genomic epidemiology. Reconstructing a detailed spatial history of 
virus spread from the origin of an outbreak is generally a task for phylogeographic 
methods60, which provide location estimates for every ancestral node in a virus phylogeny 
using simple stochastic (or ‘random walk’) models. Phylogeographic analyses, for example, 
were used to show how Ebola virus spread across West Africa during the 2013-2016 
epidemic (Fig. 3)61. Importantly, virus genome sampling with strong spatiotemporal coverage 
allowed for the dissection of the entire epidemic into a metapopulation of short- and long-
lived transmission chains61. Similar analyses were also used to show that multiple 
introductions were responsible for sustaining the 2016 Zika outbreak in Florida62. It is 
important, however, to appreciate the uncertainty of phylogeographic estimates, and to bear 
in mind that such analyses may only be capable of elucidating partial pictures of outbreak 
spread. In addition, sampling biases may severely affect these analyses, although the 
coalescent and birth-death models mentioned above have been extended to account for 
aspects of virus population structure63–65, making the analyses more robust to sampling 
heterogeneity66.  
Phylogeographic inference methods can also be used to provide insights into the factors 
driving virus spread (Fig. 3)67. Such analyses are enabled by the integration of virus 
genomics with diverse meta-data sets and are critically dependent on the timeliness of data 
generation and open sharing. These approaches were initially introduced to confirm the key 
role of human air transportation in the global circulation of influenza viruses67, but they have 
also been useful in untangling complex virus transmission dynamics on smaller scales61. To 
illustrate these methods, in Figure 3 we show an application of generalized linear modeling 
to explain Ebola virus migration rates between locations as a function of several potential 
predictors, to infer virus spread during West African Ebola outbreak (Fig. 3). In this case, 
geographic distances and population sizes at the location of origin and destination combine 
into a gravity-model of spread, where virus transmission largely occur within large population 
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centers and geographic spread being more frequent over shorter distances61. These 
phylodynamic studies illustrate the growing importance of data integration for virus genomic 
analyses55, which critically depend on accurate metadata (e.g., sampling date and sampling 
location), as well as other data sources that can capture host mobility and geographic, 
demographic, and epidemiological context. 
Inter-epidemic evolution and spread 
Once outbreaks have been brought under control or been (temporarily) resolved, 
phylogenetic analyses can provide insights into evolutionary patterns during inter-epidemic 
periods, by comparing virus genome sequences sampled across different outbreaks. The 
most fundamental question is whether the virus in question has been able to persist in 
human populations between outbreaks, so that each new outbreak has arisen from an 
endemically circulating lineage (e.g., dengue virus), or whether they represent independent 
zoonotic spillover events from an animal reservoir (e.g., Ebola virus). With sufficient 
sampling of viruses from human and reservoir species this question can be answered using 
standard phylogenetic analysis. For example, although both dengue virus and yellow fever 
virus have transmission cycles that involve mosquitoes and humans (urban transmission) or 
nonhuman primates (sylvatic transmission), phylogenetic analyses have shown that dengue 
virus is now an entirely endemic urban virus that does not rely on its sylvatic vectors and 
hosts to seed new epidemics68. Most human outbreaks of yellow fever, in contrast, have 
been shown by virus genomics approaches to represent independent emergences of the 
virus from sylvatic sources, rather than spread via an urban cycle69,70.  
Inter-epidemic analyses can also be used to elucidate the nature of virus evolution and 
spread in reservoir species, which are likely characterized by different evolutionary forces 
than those seen during human outbreaks71,72. For example, although human outbreaks of 
Ebola have happened relatively frequently since the 1970s, each outbreak starts as an 
independent spillover of the virus from an animal (likely bat73) reservoir. Hence, the inter-
epidemic evolution of Ebola virus occurs in a species other than humans, such that patterns 
of genetic divergence among the viruses associated with human epidemics can provide 
insight into viral replication and transmission within reservoir hosts. For example, there have 
been suggestions that Ebola virus has spread across Africa in a wave-like manner in its 
reservoir species74; however, phylogenetic analyses incorporating virus genomic data from 
recent outbreaks are incompatible with this scenario6. Additionally, while Ebola virus 
normally evolves according to a relatively constant molecular clock6,45,75–77, the phylogenetic 
branch leading to the viruses sequenced from the small Ebola outbreak that occurred in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2014, concurrent with the 2013-2016 epidemic in West 
Africa, was characterized by a far lower evolutionary rate78. Although the reasons for this 
reduction in evolutionary tempo are unclear, it is possible that it reflects Ebola virus evolution 
in a different (unknown) reservoir species that experiences a lower rate of viral replication. 
Alternatively, this rate disparity may result from the existence of different viral replication 
states within the same reservoir host, similar to that described during human epidemics, with 
faster rates observed during continuous human-to-human transmission and slower rates 
during persistent infections of Ebola survivors79. 
Requirements and challenges in genomic epidemiology 
Virus genomic methods for outbreak investigation and control are powerful additions to more 
traditional epidemiological approaches but are critically dependent on well planned and 
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coordinated efforts. The foremost need for genomic epidemiology is timely access to clinical 
samples and data, which should be built on productive and equitable collaborations with 
local communities, public health agencies, outbreak responders, local clinics, and 
researchers80. For each clinical sample to be used for virus genomic sequencing, it is 
essential to obtain a minimal set of metadata related to the infection, including (1) the date of 
sample collection and/or onset of symptoms and (2) the location of sampling. Additional 
information can greatly increase the utility of genomic epidemiology, including the availability 
of (3) travel and contact history, (4) suspected source of infection, and (5) clinical outcome 
and symptoms. Other factors, including patient history, age, sex, and economic status can 
also help to reveal risk factors underlying infection and transmission. Within ethical 
constraints, it is important that communication lines remain open so that researchers 
undertaking data analysis can return actionable results to the public health community.  
Other large-scale data resources are essential for investigating the spatio-temporal history 
and spread of an outbreak. These include the temporal and spatial distribution of cases, 
ecological conditions, vector abundance, environmental factors, and travel patterns. 
Integration of these other data sources with virus genomic data may reveal new properties of 
an outbreak, potentially leading to actionable measures55,61,67. Non-genomic data often 
comes from established networks of collaborations, or from the public domain, highlighting 
the value of open data and data sharing to outbreak investigations. 
An important benefit of genomic epidemiology is that it can directly compare and jointly 
analyze virus genome sequences obtained during an epidemic, even if those sequences 
were generated by different laboratories. Consequently, there is an urgent need to make 
genomic and epidemiological data and analysis tools publically available during ongoing 
epidemics81. This movement is supported by the World Health Organization (WHO), who 
have called for data pertaining to public health emergencies to be disseminated openly and 
immediately upon generation, and not withheld until the acceptance or publication of a 
corresponding scientific paper82. More recently, the WHO has outlined the current and future 
benefits of virus genome data sharing during outbreaks83. Combined with an acceleration of 
making manuscripts available via preprint servers, such as arXiv and bioRxiv, especially 
during outbreaks84, there has been a shift towards scientists storing their data and source 
code on depositories like GitHub (github.com), Synapse (synapse.org), and Data Dryad 
(datadryad.org), in close to real-time for others to use. Furthermore, extensive online 
communities and forums like Twitter (twitter.com), Virological (virological.org), FluTrackers 
(flutrackers.com), ProMED (promedmail.org), Nextstrain (nextstrain.org), HealthMap 
(healthmap.org), and Microreact (microreact.org) allow for rapid dissemination of 
unpublished results and analyses. In our experience, not only does the process of open 
science promote new collaborations and lead to more accurate scientific insights into 
outbreak research, but it helps in getting relevant information rapidly into the hands of 
decision makers. Despite these advances, however, the speed, nature, and extent of virus 
genome data sharing is inconsistent, sometimes resulting in confusion over what is, or 
should be, best practice81,85. 
Future perspective 
Genomic epidemiology promises much to the study and control of infectious disease 
outbreaks, particularly if viral genomes can be acquired and analyzed in real-time. The 
accumulated set of these data - together with the rapid development of sophisticated 
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software packages (virological.org/c/software) - will provide a valuable resolve for the 
mitigation and control of future outbreaks. Ultimately, with sufficient genome sequences from 
individual viral genera and/or families, it may be possible to categorize viruses by their 
phylogenetic patterns and utilize this information in epidemic preparedness. For example, as 
well as considering obvious biological features of viruses such as their genome structure and 
mode of transmission, it may be possible to group viruses according to a series of 
evolutionary variables such as rate of evolutionary change, extent of antigenic evolution, 
frequency of recombination, pattern of geographic spread, and population dynamics. This 
information may then help forecast the evolutionary behaviour of any virus should it 
reemerge in human populations and assist in the selection of future vaccine strains86–88. This 
information will also help counter alarmist claims that emerging viruses will evolve novel 
phenotypes, such as airborne transmission in the case of Ebola virus89, that often 
accompany any major disease outbreak. It is clear, however, that a more fundamental 
understanding of the genetic and ecological barriers of virus spillover into human populations 
is needed to better identify risk factors for disease emergence. Long-term capacity building, 
partnerships with local communities, and commitments to long-term investments on these 
fronts will go a long way towards better enabling the global community to effectively and 
rapidly deal with future emerging outbreaks80. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Outbreak scenarios and the resulting phylogenetic trees of virus genomes 
from sampled human cases. The first three scenarios show a single introduction from a 
non-human reservoir followed by human-to-human spread. (a) A small outbreak from a 
recent zoonosis with a commensurately short tree, suggesting recent emergence. The R0 is 
greater than 1 indicating the potential to cause a large outbreak. (b) A medium sized 
outbreak with a deeper tree and internal nodes dispersed. With an R0 close to 1, this 
suggests that emergence into humans was not recent and its transmission potential is just 
sufficient to persist. The root of the tree is not the index case meaning the zoonosis could be 
older. (c) A large outbreak with an R0 greater than 1 and thus exhibiting exponential growth 
in case numbers. Distinctively for a growing epidemic, internal nodes tend to be towards the 
root of the tree, suggesting that only a small fraction of the total cases were sampled. (d) A 
scenario of repeated zoonotic jumps with limited human to human transmission. The internal 
parts of the tree represent the diversity of the virus in the non-human reservoir and the 
human-to-human transmission cases are closely related. 
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Figure 2. Transmission chain tracking during outbreaks using virus genomics. (a) 
Viral genome sequences were used to distinguish between competing hypotheses for the 
source of the viruses that triggered the Ebola flare-ups in West Africa. The three main 
hypotheses and their expected genomic signatures are illustrated here with a hypothetical 
haplotype network. Genomes from all of the observed flare-ups grouped closely with 
genomes sequenced from patients in the same country, from earlier in the outbreak (bottom 
left), consistent with transmission from persistent sources. In contrast, genomes linked to re-
introductions from neighboring countries (right) would be expected to cluster with genomes 
from a different country and from late in the outbreak, and in the case of independent 
spillovers from a reservoir host (top left, i.e., independent sampling from the diversity 
circulating within the reservoir), the spillover genomes would be linked to the main outbreak 
by a long branch originating from near the root of the network. GIN, Guinea; LBR, Liberia; 
SLE, Sierra Leone. (b) Expected ‘genomic resolution’ for the inference of transmission 
chains at the level of individual infections. Resolution is dependent on the serial interval 
between infections (x-axis; used as a proxy for epidemiological generation time) as well as 
the genome size and nucleotide substitution rate (y-axis).  
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Figure 3. Integration and testing predictors of phylogeographic spread. We illustrate 
the concept of this approach using the 2013-2016 Ebola epidemic in West Africa. 
Geographic distances between all pairs of locations, in this case administrative areas in 
Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, as well as population sizes at the origin and destination of 
these pairs are combined into a transition rate matrix through a generalized linear model. 
This matrix parameterizes the phylogenetic process of spread that is being estimated. Each 
predictors is associated with a coefficient, β, which denotes the strength of contribution with 
some predictors (e.g., population size) positively associated with the intensity of migration 
whereas others (e.g., geographic distance) are negatively associated. A coefficient of zero 
implies that the predictor is excluded from the model (represented in the figure by the 
transparent matrix with β=0).  
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Tables/Boxes 
Table 1 – Critical questions addressed by viral genomic epidemiology.  
Questions Examples from Genomic Epidemiology References 
What virus is causing the outbreak? Metagenomic sequencing from patient samples revealed a 
novel virus - Lujo virus - as the causal virus for an outbreak in 
South Africa in 2008. 
23 
How is the virus transmitting? Sequencing studies of MERS-CoV combined with coalescent 
approaches showed that human outbreaks are driven by 
seasonally varying zoonotic transfer of viruses from camels. 
90,91 
Where did the outbreak begin? Large-scale sequencing efforts and phylogenetic analyses 
showed that the 2009 influenza A/H1N1 pandemic originated 
in swine populations from Mexico. 
5,46 
What factors drive the outbreak? Analysis of more than 1,600 Ebola virus genomes identified 
critical factors that contributed to the spread of the virus during 
the 2013-2016 epidemic in West Africa. 
61 
How many introductions have there been? Sequencing of Zika virus from patients and mosquitos in 
Florida showed that multiple introduction events of the virus 
sustained the 2016 outbreak in Miami and surrounding 
counties. 
62 
When did the outbreak begin? Large-scale studies showed that the Zika epidemic in the 
Americas likely started in Brazil more than a year earlier than 
was initially believed.  
7,92–94 
Are outbreaks linked? Analysis of Ebola virus genomes during the 2013-2016 
epidemic showed that the virus can persist for more than a 
year in survivors, and be responsible for flare-ups of the 
outbreak via sexual transmission. 
52,57,95,96 
How is the virus evolving? Sequencing studies during the 2013-2016 Ebola epidemic 
identified mutations in the virus genome that rapidly rose to 
high frequency compatible with increased fitness. 
Experimental follow-up studies showed that some of those 
mutations were likely Ebola virus adapting to a new host. 
71,72,97 
Footnote: Examples of commonly used software packages for genomic epidemiology investigations are available at: 
virological.org/c/software. 
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Box 1 - Outbreak of ‘Disease X’ - a hypothetical scenario 
In addition to the Ebola, SARS, and Zika viruses, the WHO watchlist of viruses that may 
lead to public health emergencies98 for the first time acknowledged that the next serious 
epidemic may be caused by a currently unknown virus - ‘Disease X’. Its inclusion 
emphasizes the need for flexible and deployable platforms to understand and combat 
disease outbreaks of many varieties. Most likely, Disease X may be a known microbe 
believed to cause no or mild human disease, as was the case Zika virus before its 
epidemic in the Americas. Disease X could emerge anywhere in the world and, given the 
mobility of human populations, could spread to distant and highly populated regions within 
days or weeks. To illustrate how genomic epidemiology can successfully reveal important 
aspects of disease emergence and inform epidemic control efforts, we present a 
hypothetical scenario in which Disease X successfully jumped into humans, established 
sustained transmission, and caused severe disease. 
In Miami, Florida (United States), a 22 year old man sought medical assistance after an 
influenza-like illness suddenly progressed to a dangerously high fever and laboured 
breathing. He reported golfing activity at nearby resorts, harboring clusters of wildlife, 
including birds. He was admitted into the emergency room and within three days died of 
pneumonia. During this time, five other young adults presented with similar symptoms to 
Miami-area hospitals. Standard molecular diagnostics for commonly suspected pathogens 
were negative, but IgM antibodies collected from each patient were slightly cross-reactive 
to MERS and SARS coronaviruses. Since the virus could not be conclusively identified 
with conventional assays, metagenomic sequencing was used to identify Disease X as a 
novel human virus, most closely related to other coronaviruses in ducks (Panel a). 
Importantly, due to the relatedness of the novel virus to a family of viruses with well-
defined host-ranges, these data led to a hypothesis about its potential origin and reservoir 
(overwintering migratory birds in the nearby Everglades wetlands) and allowed for the 
development of virus-specific diagnostics and targeted sequencing approaches.  
Within three weeks, there were 40 new laboratory-confirmed Disease X cases, including 
eight from healthcare workers who contacted the original six cases, and five total deaths 
(an 11% apparent case fatality rate). Targeted sequencing from 15 patients and related 
viruses, including from ducks across Southern Florida, revealed that the human Disease X 
viruses clustered together on a phylogenetic tree and shared a common ancestor with 
virus genomes from ducks near Palm Beach, suggesting there was a single zoonotic 
spillover event and subsequent human-to-human transmission (Panel b). A molecular 
clock phylogenetic analysis further indicated that the common ancestor of the human 
viruses existed several months ago, suggesting that the first patient identified was not the 
first case of the outbreak, and highlighting the possibility of many more unreported or 
asymptomatic cases. 
As the outbreak progressed, there was a critical need to understand transmission to help 
control further spread. Traditional epidemiology, including contact tracing, provided 
important insights into the risk factors for transmission. Virus genome sequencing was 
used to infer transmission chains that linked each infected patient (Panel c). These 
analysis revealed that (1) transmission occurred primarily between individuals that had 
been in close proximity and (2) a few individuals infected most of the known cases. In 
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response, an action plan of patient isolation/containment and widespread use of 
facemasks was implemented to reduce close contact and aerosol transmission. 
The Disease X outbreak peaked within a year, resulting in ~2000 cases in Florida and 
several imported cases throughout the world. Most of the imported cases did not result in 
secondary local infections, with the exception of two healthcare workers in New York City 
and a large outbreak of more than a 100 cases near Havana, Cuba. Factors leading to 
local and global spread were investigated by layering transportation, geographic, climatic, 
economic, and demographic information into a large phylogenetic data set of Disease X 
viruses (Panel d). Analyses indicated that virus dispersal from Miami was more likely to 
occur to large cities that were either (1) in close driving proximity or (2) connected by direct 
flights with high travel volumes. Once in a new city, the success of virus transmission was 
correlated with low economic status and high population density. This raised concerns 
about Disease X outbreaks emerging in low income and densely populated countries 
within the Caribbean and Central America. The WHO used this information to implement 
comprehensive surveillance and response efforts in at risk nations. 
 
Real-time genomic investigation of ‘Disease X’. (a) Metagenomic sequencing revealed that ‘Disease X’, which could not 
be identified using standard clinical assays, was a novel virus. (b) Targeted sequencing from additional human cases and 
from related viruses uncovered the likely animal reservoir, the time period that it was introduced into the human population 
(represented by * in the lower panel), and that subsequent transmission was human-to-human. (c) More intensive virus 
genome sequencing was used to construct detailed transmission chains and identify potential control measures. (d) Layering 
additional climatic (pictured in the lower panel; source: https://www.climate.gov/maps-data), transportation, geographic, 
economic, and demographic information into a large phylogenetic data set revealed the risk factors that facilitated local and 
global spread. 
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Box 2 - Molecular technologies for detecting and tracking outbreaks 
Traditional methods  
The methods traditionally used to diagnose infectious disease agents in patients are 
developed to detect either antigens (e.g., ELISAs and lateral flow assays), or nucleic acids 
(e.g., PCR) derived from the pathogen. These assays are typically designed to recognize 
either single (e.g., Ebola virus) or closely related (e.g., Filoviridae) pathogens. Versions of 
such assays may also be combined in a multiplexed fashion to detect a small number of 
different pathogens (e.g., hemorrhagic fever viruses). While most laboratories are capable 
of running these assays, they are often not available for uncommon or novel pathogens, 
and running multiple rounds of testing can take weeks. They also require a priori 
knowledge of putative pathogens and they typically cannot be used to detect outbreaks 
that are caused by novel, highly divergent, understudied, or rare pathogens. 
Deployable solutions 
Over the last several years, robust and deployable solutions have been developed for 
pathogen detection that do not require the maintenance of a cold chain, which can be 
difficult or impossible under many outbreak conditions. Simple-to-use, point-of-care rapid 
diagnostic tests (RDTs) have the potential to transform early outbreak detection. For 
example, the ReEBOV antigen rapid test for Ebola virus infection developed during the 
recent epidemic could be deployed throughout sub-Saharan Africa to help detect new 
outbreaks99,100. Simple nucleic acid assays, like loop-mediated isothermal amplification 
(LAMP) developed for Zika virus101, H5N1 avian influenza virus102, and SARS 
coronavirus103, have eliminated the need for thermal cycling and most power 
requirements. New and creative advances in microfluidics104, nanowire arrays105, and field-
effect biosensors106,107 are also helping to reduce the barriers to efficient and rapid 
diagnostics, while increasing sensitivity and specificity of detection. Of particular interest 
for deployment in resource-limited settings, are paper-based engineered gene circuits, like 
sensors designed for strain-specific Ebola virus detection108. They are stable for long-term 
storage at room temperature and are activated by rehydration, and thus can be used in 
remote environments. Very recently, highly sensitive and deployable CRISPR-based 
diagnostics have also been developed that utilizes CRISPR-Cas13/12a to detect 
pathogen-derived nucleic acids109–112. Similarly to the traditional methods described above, 
all of these tools require a priori knowledge of likely causal pathogens and the availability 
of antibodies, genome sequences, or other pathogen characteristics. 
Sequencing-based methods 
Untargeted metagenomic sequencing provides a potential one-step solution for outbreak 
pathogen detection of both known and novel pathogens, and may be able to replace the 
need for multiple individual pathogen assays24. The main advantage of metagenomic 
sequencing is that it does not require a priori knowledge of the pathogen, but comes at the 
expense of specialized equipment, increased costs, and bioinformatic complexity. 
Although high backgrounds of host nucleic acid and/or low pathogen titers in clinical 
samples can make pathogen detection difficult, host gene depletion113 and pathogen 
enrichment114,115 methods can help alleviate these issues. After the first outbreak pathogen 
genome sequence has been obtained, targeted approaches using next-generation 
sequencing can also be developed. This was the case for both of the recent Zika and 
Ebola epidemics116,117, where cheaper and faster amplicon-based approaches were rapidly 
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developed and deployed to track both of the epidemics. The most common platforms used 
for these purposes are those developed by Illumina (e.g., MiSeq and HiSeq), because 
they have high accuracy and throughput, but have high costs and relatively short read 
lengths (up to 300 bp). Cheaper portable devices, such as the miniaturized Oxford 
Nanopore MinION can help to produce data in close to real time directly in-country and 
under austere conditions93,117. This is a significant advancement because, along with open 
data sharing, rapid diagnostics and sequencing helps to promote a comprehensive and 
collaborative response network. 
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